The United States has adopted a static and stark picture of al-Shabaab that has magnified the truly dangerous aspects of the organization and alienated dimensions of the movement that could contribute to a solution to Somalia’s problems.

Al-Shabaab is an armed social organization and movement that has expertly framed the Somali conflagration in such a way as to maximize its mobilization efforts. It depicts itself as primarily a youth movement, having started its recruitment as a nascent court militia in 2004 among Mogadishu’s orphans and abandoned children. In fact, the name al-Shabaab means “youth.” The youth are a new voice, with a different message and set of experiences than the traditional government elites, and they are more willing to accept al-Shabaab’s anti-clan ideology.

AN INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT

As an indigenous movement, al-Shabaab is attuned to the history of Somalia and to the sensibilities and desires of its people. It provides a counter-hegemonic challenge to an international community that has insisted on statebuilding as the panacea to the various issues plaguing Somalia. It stands against the international policy of attempting to prop up of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in spite of its demonstrated failure to establish authority within the country.

The February 2006 invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia was a key moment in establishing al-Shabaab as an important factor in Somali politics. Al-Shabaab was able to reframe and reshape the fighting as a struggle for national self-determination. It gained 3 of the 18 seats on the Executive Council of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) administration, which temporarily controlled South-Central Somalia in 2006, with 3 additional seats going to Islamists within the al-Shabaab umbrella.

Al-Shabaab is a diverse and hydra-headed organization that has shown a willingness to negotiate power-sharing agreements.

In some respects al-Shabaab has been making the transition from an ideological, dogmatic court militia consisting of a hardened core of true believers backed by mercenary guns to a broadly based political movement. It is a diverse and hydra-headed organization that has shown a willingness to negotiate power-sharing agreements to maintain control over territory.

Even as it battles for control of Mogadishu with the transitional government and its international backers, al-Shabaab has stabilized control elsewhere via negotiations with local elders and a newfound tolerance for venerated Sufi shrines. It is trying to govern in the areas it controls, imposing a sometimes draconian version of law and order. It is evolving into a state-like body with a greater chance of imposing political order over Somalia than the fledgling transitional government.

Al-Shabaab was added to the U.S. terrorism list in March 2008, 28 months before its first act of violence outside of Somalia (a bombing in Kampala in July 2010). Rather than allowing the listing to be a hindrance, the organization tried to use it to its advantage. Al-Shabaab converted the terrorist designation and its subsequent international notoriety into capital, literally, as other listed Islamist groups began to provide increased financial support to the organization.

A PRAGMATIC MOVEMENT

The international community continues to look at al-Shabaab through the frame of “international terrorism” and refuses to acknowledge the shifting reality of al-Shabaab’s efforts to transition toward a greater governing role. In spite of its rigorous application of an Islamist lens, al-Shabaab has proven to be a pragmatic movement, forming broad coalitions with other groups within Somalia when such alliances serve its interests and even adapting a softer stance toward various social practices it once considered unacceptable.

Moderate voices within al-Shabaab’s leadership have been silenced, with dire consequences for peacebuilding efforts within Somalia.

The terrorist designation of al-Shabaab has forced peacebuilding NGOs to evacuate most of the area of Somalia to avoid coming into contact with the organization and being accused of colluding with “terrorists.” This is hindering the transformation of al-Shabaab toward more pragmatic deal-brokering while strengthening the hold of hardened dogmatism. More moderate voices within al-Shabaab’s official leadership have been increasingly silenced. This has created dire consequences for peacebuilding efforts within Somalia. Imposing a static identity on a dynamic group like al-Shabaab is neither helpful for advancing peace nor honest to the reality of its evolving social character.

AN INCLUSIVE PEACE PROCESS

Al-Shabaab has successfully contested both the secular statist impositions of the international community and the clannist psychology of traditional Somali power-holders. It has attempted to push forward a pragmatic agenda of change and political participation by previously excluded groups. Rather than excluding al-Shabaab from negotiations, international policymakers should encourage its participation as they seek to create an inclusive peace process.

Ryne Close is a Ph.D. student in history and peace studies at the University of Notre Dame. This post is adapted from his article in the new report “Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding.” (pdf)

Hundreds of people fleeing drought, famine and civil war in Somalia wait in line to register at Ifo refugee camp in Dadaab, Kenya. According to the U.N., 3.7 million Somalis are in crisis. (Photo: Internews Network/Flickr)

John Paul Lederach

The U.S. government’s list of “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” is a central part of a counter-terrorism strategy based on the isolation of individuals and groups who espouse violence defined as terrorism. This strategy makes it illegal to provide material support to those individuals and groups, which increasingly is interpreted to prohibit any contact or consultation with groups on the list.

Peacebuilding, on the other hand, proposes a strategy of engagement. Engagement requires contact and deliberative dialogue, inclusive of all views. It develops processes that focus on accurately understanding the sources of violence and addressing them through a range of nonviolent change strategies.

Proponents of isolation often express concerns about the unintended consequences of engagement. They believe that engagement represents a form of negotiating with terrorists. The deeper apprehension is that contact and engagement with these groups may increase their legitimacy and give them undue recognition. This concern is coupled with a deep suspicion that extremist groups may take advantage of dialogue to increase the violence.

RECOGNIZING THE GRAY AREA

The us/them approach to counterterrorism requires a capacity to distinguish sharply between those who are activists in organizations that espouse terrorism and those who have absolutely no connection to such groups. In the real world, there is no such sharp line, but rather a spectrum.

Especially in regions such as South-Central Somalia, this gray area includes people and organizations that have some form of contact or affiliation — often not by their choice  — with people and groups on the designated terrorist lists. This may be simply because they live in a particular area, share a common religious background, or have extended family links, among many other reasons. After considerable years of experience in many of these settings, my own view is that this gray area may be much larger and harder to define than we understand.

According to the literature on the dynamics of conflict escalation, as conflict escalates and polarization sharpens, people face increasing social pressure to join one side or the other. Outside threats may lead to greater internal or in-group cohesion. In highly polarized contexts, people within a group have more contact and interaction with those who share their views and concerns and correspondingly much less with those of differing perspectives. This creates greater opportunity for extreme views to rise to prominence. Tolerance for ambiguity diminishes. Little or no room exists for questions or the expression of alternative views.

Engagement seeks to transform, through consultation and dialogue, the justification for violence and the support it may receive.

Here we find some of the most intriguing responses to the two approaches. Engagement seeks to transform, through consultation and dialogue, the justification for violence and the support it may receive. Contact and conversation create mechanisms for people with competing views to interact. The very existence of alternative conversations demands more from an organization’s leaders than facile and monolithic explanations about why violence is needed and justified. Isolation, on the other hand, decreases outside contact and the introduction of alternative views. As a result, it may well strengthen the control of extremist leaders rather than reduce their sphere of influence.

ALTERNATIVES TO VIOLENCE

Isolation may be driven by a desire to control future acts of terrorism, but it does little, if anything, to address the complexity of the contexts where the approach has been applied. As a strategy, it does not contribute to mid or long-term change.

Engagement incorporates concrete ideas about change. It is not meant to provide a policing function or to be used to control particular acts of terrorism in the short-term. If engagement is robust and active, however, particularly in the form of ongoing negotiations, it offers opportunities for presenting alternatives to violence.

To shift extremist leaders and the wider society in which they operate away from violence and toward nonviolence, we must engage with all levels of a movement’s leadership. In particular, given that many extremist movements rely heavily on youth, we need strategies that consider the development of new and alternative leaders. Isolation as a blanket policy holds little promise for change. Engagement strategies, however, focus on the conditions from which violence emerges, locating and creating opportunities that make change possible.

John Paul Lederach is professor of international peacebuilding at the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. This post is adapted from the new report “Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding.” (pdf).

In July 2010, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment does not protect groups or individuals who provide “expert advice or assistance” or “training” to proscribed terrorist groups, even when they do so to further peacebuilding efforts.

This means that “any service that can be construed as having tangible or intangible monetary value—such as providing advice, reviewing a contract, covering transportation costs—can be considered a violation of U.S. material support statutes.”[1] The ruling makes it illegal to convene meetings or conferences for a proscribed group or to act as a negotiator on its behalf.

The Holder decision has had an impact not only on the work of U.S. and international nongovernmental organizations, but also on Somali organizations. Some Muslim agencies, fearful of being added to the terrorist list, have had to assume different identities. The business community was paralyzed by the American decision to label certain businesses as terrorist groups. Orphanages could no longer receive food when Al-Harman’s assets were frozen, and many turned to other resource-stretched Somali organizations for help.

HOW TO HELP IN SOMALIA

Since the 1990s, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has grappled with how to provide development aid in a country without a government structure. According to its Somalia programs web page, USAID “responds to Somalia’s key challenges by supporting peace-building and national reconciliation initiatives, building the capacity of governance institutions and civil society groups, improving the delivery of social services, and meeting humanitarian and early recovery needs.”[2] The agency has been impeded, however, by a dearth of contacts with Somali civil society. It has faced problems identifying and working through alternative sources of social and political authority.

Eliminating barriers to working with groups on the list would enable the U.S. government to better identify civil society interlocutors.

Effective peacebuilding requires knowledge of how parties to a conflict understand their roles and how they envision peace. Lack of understanding can lead to misguided direction of resources. According to a recent policy brief from Accord, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, “inappropriate international engagement based on inadequate analysis has helped to mobilize militants” in Somalia.[3] Eliminating barriers to working with groups on the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list would enable USAID and its partners to better identify civil society interlocutors. It would allow U.S. officials to assess the role and Somali perceptions of al-Shabaab and provide more focused support for peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives.

THE FREEDOM TO ENGAGE

To realize the full potential of a strategic peacebuilding approach, U.S. government officials and NGO representatives need the freedom to engage in dialogue with all parties to the conflict—including those designated as terrorist organizations. The International Crisis Group has called for efforts to reach out to those elements of al-Shabaab that are open to some form of political settlement. Limited engagement strategies that exclude al-Shabaab will not help to pacify Somalia, according to the Crisis Group.[4]

The United States should take steps to demilitarize its policy in favor of civilian-led diplomacy and peacebuilding in partnership with Somali civil society organizations. Congress could facilitate this process by amending material support and terrorist listing laws, including the U.S. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which gave the executive branch the authority to create the FTO list.

The Office of Foreign Asset Controls could be directed to “proactively open a direct channel to peacebuilding groups, while concurrently expediting specific requests” for waivers to engage with FTOs.[5] These steps would enable U.S., international, and Somali NGOs to pursue more effective and inclusive diplomacy, development, and peacebuilding strategies.

An alternative framework in Somalia focuses on human-centered, relationship-driven engagement that begins to address cycles of violence.

Adherence to a ‘war on terror’ framework has been an obstacle to constructive social change. An alternative framework that focuses on human-centered, relationship-driven, respectful engagement could begin to facilitate a gradual shift in U.S. policy toward effectively addressing cycles of violence in Somalia.

When the practices of governments and international institutions are informed by local experience and perspective, this can lead to greater civil society participation in the development of economic opportunities and responsive governance, thereby engendering more ownership in creating sustainable peace.

Laura Weis is a Ph.D. student in history and peace studies at the University of Notre Dame. This post is adapted from her article in the new report “Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding.” (pdf)

Old thinking retains its grip at the Pentagon. The vested interests that profit from excessive military spending remain a formidable lobby. Congress sustains nuclear postures that are inherited from the Cold War and continues to fund unneeded weapons systems. Military officials and politicians alike seem unable to conceive of a future without the bomb.

Yet some of the principal architects of the Cold War have now become advocates of disarmament. It is one of the ironies of our age that Cold War wannabes in Washington cling to outmoded policies, while genuine cold warriors of the past now call for a world without nuclear weapons.

THE FOUR HORSEMEN

The most important voices against the bomb are those of the “four horsemen”— former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and former Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn. All are eminent statesmen who spent their careers justifying and building nuclear weapons but who now recognize the need to abandon them. In the process they have reshaped the global nuclear debate.

The four eminent statesmen who spent their careers justifying and building nuclear weapons now call for a world without nuclear weapons.

The “neo-abolitionist” cause emerged from a conference in 2006 at the Hoover Institution commemorating the 20th anniversary of Reykjavik. That was the dramatic international summit at which Reagan and Gorbachev came breathlessly close to an agreement on complete nuclear disarmament. After that conference Shultz, Kissinger, Perry, and Nunn wrote their now famous articles in the Wall Street Journal announcing their support for disarmament, making the case for eliminating all nuclear weapons and listing concrete steps toward achieving that goal.

THE CASE OF WILLIAM PERRY

For the group of four, the commitment to nuclear abolition is a striking departure from previous beliefs. William Perry spent most of his professional life in the Pentagon building and maintaining nuclear weapons. At the end of the Cold War, however, he realized that the vast remaining arsenals of the United States and Russia were a security liability rather than an asset. His support for disarmament results from a deepening concern about the spread of nuclear weapons to other governments and potentially to non-state actors and the consequent risk of nuclear use and terrorist acquisition.

There are fewer nuclear weapons, but they are in a growing number of hands, and they are coveted by those who would not hesitate to use them to inflict maximum loss of life.

Perry warns that the danger of a bomb actually exploding somewhere has increased since the end of the Cold War. There are fewer weapons in the world, but they are in a growing number of hands, and they are coveted by those who would not hesitate to use them to inflict maximum loss of life and global chaos. Many international experts and policy reports have called attention to the twin threats of nuclear proliferation and terrorism, including the Hans Blix Commission.

COMPLETING UNFINISHED BUSINESS

It is not only fear but hope that inspires the growing disarmament movement. For Shultz especially, the goal is to rekindle the spirit of Reagan and Gorbachev and their commitment to transformational disarmament. He was present at Reykjavik at the most pivotal moments as the two leaders exchanged agreed plans for reducing nuclear weapons to zero. He knows it would be possible to negotiate such a staged process. In Reagan’s vision it would include shared missile defenses to protect against cheating. Shultz, Perry, and their confreres want to complete the unfinished business of Reykjavik, a binding agreement among the major powers to rid the world of nuclear weapons.

The goal is to rekindle the spirit of Reagan and Gorbachev and their commitment to transformational disarmament.

The journey toward that goal will be a long one, but steps in that direction are being made, including implementation of the New START arms reduction treaty and the declared commitment of the United Nations Security Council to a world without nuclear weapons. Efforts by the four elders undoubtedly have helped to make this possible. Now in their 80s and early 90s, respectively, Perry and Shultz could be resting on their laurels. Instead they continue to campaign across the globe for their lofty vision. We owe them a debt of gratitude.

David Cortright is director of policy studies at the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

The ballistic missile submarine USS Tennessee returns to Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay. Photo: Official U.S. Navy Imagery (Flickr)

Cardinal Roger Mahony

Few challenges are more urgent for Catholic teaching on war and peace than the awesome and unprecedented power of nuclear weapons. In evaluating nuclear deterrence, the U.S. bishops have proposed an “interim ethic” whereby nuclear deterrence could be morally acceptable under three strict conditions:

Sole use. Nuclear deterrence should be limited to deterring the use of nuclear weapons and not expanded to include nuclear-war fighting strategies or using nuclear weapons to deter nonnuclear threats.

Sufficiency. The goal should be to have only enough weapons necessary to deter nuclear use, not enough weapons to achieve nuclear superiority.

Disarmament. Deterrence must be used as a step toward progressive disarmament.

This ethical analysis of deterrence is tightly linked to a nonnuclear ethic—that is, an ethic of nonproliferation and abolition.

In order to counter the idea that nuclear deterrence is an end in itself, Church statements since the end of the Cold War have dramatically shifted in emphasis from the reluctant acknowledgment of the need for a strictly limited deterrent to the need to embrace a nonnuclear ethic.

Archbishop Francis Chullikatt, the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations, noted recently that the Church is challenging “the institutionalization of deterrence.” He notes that the doctrine of deterrence has become a permanent, not a temporary, rationale for spending vast sums to maintain and modernize nuclear arsenals for the indefinite future.

The Church abhors any use of nuclear weapons and is convinced that we must move toward a mutual, verifiable global ban on nuclear weapons.

The nuclear powers, according to the archbishop, irresponsibly refuse to enter a process of negotiations aimed at ultimately banning nuclear weapons. The institutionalization of deterrence also reinforces the moral double standard of the nuclear powers, in which some states rely on nuclear weapons while simultaneously denying that right to other states. The institutionalization of deterrence is also a form of theft from the poor, in which billions of dollars continue to be spent on nuclear arsenals while urgent development needs go unmet.

The Church abhors any use of nuclear weapons, finds the nuclear status quo morally unacceptable, and is convinced that the moral imperative is to move carefully but courageously toward a mutual, verifiable global ban on nuclear weapons.

The Church does not reject the need to deter the use of nuclear weapons—that is a moral imperative. But it rejects the view that nuclear deterrence is the only option in the long-term, a permanent component of security in a nuclear age. It is nuclear disarmament, not nuclear deterrence, that is a long-term basis for security.

PROTECTING HUMAN LIFE AND DIGNITY

At the Global Zero Summit in Paris in 2010, Archbishop Edwin O’Brien, then head of the Archdiocese of Military Services, said that as we look ahead, “Every nuclear weapons system and every nuclear weapons policy should be judged by the ultimate goal of protecting human life and dignity and the related goal of ridding the world of these weapons in mutually verifiable ways.”

Steps that could be taken in keeping with that overarching criterion include:

• ratifying and bringing into force the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
• reducing our nation’s reliance on nuclear weapons, as the new Nuclear Posture Review begins to do;
• securing nuclear materials from terrorists as called for at the Nuclear Security Summit;
• adopting a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty to prohibit production of weapons-grade material; and
• strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency.

These and other policy measures represent only partial steps on the way to nuclear disarmament.

The United States has a heavy moral burden to bear—and a responsibility to take the lead in nuclear disarmament.

William Perry and other military experts have done groundbreaking work on the complex strategies that must be pursued for a ban on nuclear weapons to become a reality. Similar groundbreaking work must be done by ethicists on the moral issues that arise as the world moves toward nuclear disarmament.

The United States has an especially heavy moral burden to bear. The United States has a responsibility to take the lead in nuclear disarmament and to develop the institutions and practices of cooperative security that will make that more likely and more sustainable.

THE VIRTUE OF HOPE

We must reject the sin of despair that has convinced us that we can never escape the nuclear predicament in which we find ourselves. In its place, we must embrace the virtue of hope. We must not be naïve about the real risks and daunting challenges involved in nuclear disarmament.

We cannot dis-invent nuclear weapons. But, as with biological and chemical weapons, we have a moral obligation and an ability to ban them.

Cardinal Roger Mahony is the Archbishop Emeritus of Los Angeles.

President Obama has declared that the United States is committed to creating “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,” but the policy debate in Washington often lags far behind this lofty vision. Some progress has been achieved in negotiated arms reduction, but many in Washington cling to old ways of thinking.

In February the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, entered into force. This was a real victory for nuclear disarmament. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States and Russia are obligated to reduce their strategically deployed nuclear warheads to 1,550. They will cut deployed delivery vehicles—intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear-capable bombers—to 700 over the next 7 years.

These developments will mean a 30 percent reduction in deployed warheads, a 50 percent cut in delivery launchers, and new verification measures to ensure that reductions are being implemented.

TENS OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS

But the cost of achieving these modest reductions was high. To secure the Senate votes needed for ratification, President Obama made a commitment to “modernize” the nuclear weapons complex. He pledged to spend tens of billions of additional dollars to upgrade nuclear production facilities.

Meanwhile the Pentagon is moving forward with plans to purchase new strategic nuclear delivery systems. This effort is proceeding despite the nuclear reductions that are mandated in the New START agreement and in the face of imminent cuts to the Department of Defense budget.

The Pentagon’s planned expenditures on nuclear bombers and submarines are unaffordable, unnecessary, and at odds with the reductions in the new treaty.

In the next decades the Pentagon is planning to spend more than $400 billion on new fleets of nuclear bombers and submarines, even though these systems are not needed because the overall force will be smaller. These planned expenditures are unaffordable, unnecessary, and at odds with the reductions that are part of the new treaty.

Pentagon officials acknowledge that funds may not be available for upgrading and maintaining nuclear weapons systems. In July General James Cartwright, outgoing vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, “we don’t have the money to do it.” Air Force General Robert Kehler, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, which manages U.S. nuclear forces, stated that “we’re not going to be able to go forward with weapon systems” at present costs.

The Navy is planning to build 12 new ballistic missile submarines, at an estimated cost of almost $350 billion, despite the fact that it is reducing the number of submarine-based warheads by half.

This is obvious from a look at the costs of maintaining the current ballistic missile submarine fleet. Currently the fleet comprises 12 deployed submarines, which when fully loaded carry more than 2,000 nuclear warheads.

The current submarines are scheduled for retirement over the next 30 years, so the Navy is planning to build 12 new ballistic missile submarines, at an estimated cost of almost $350 billion, despite the fact that it is reducing the number of submarine-based warheads by half. Tens of billions could be saved by cutting the submarine production program.

The Navy is not the only branch of the military with expensive plans for new nuclear capable delivery vehicles. The U.S. Air Force is planning a new Long Range Penetrating Bomber at a price tag of $40-60 billion for a fleet of 80-100 planes, even though expensive upgrade programs are already underway on existing bombers.

Under the New START agreement, the Air Force intends to field only 60 nuclear capable bombers, which it can easily do with the existing fleet. A new nuclear bomber program is completely unnecessary.

RELICS OF COLD WAR THINKING

The idea that the U.S. needs a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons is a relic of Cold War thinking. It is contrary to the U.S. commitment to disarmament and is irresponsible financially in light of the government’s current fiscal crisis.

Reducing the ballistic missile submarine fleet and canceling the new bomber program will help the United States meet its arms reduction commitments and will save tens of billions of tax dollars over the next decade.

Kelsey Davenport is a Scoville Peace Fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington, D.C. She is completing her master’s degree in international peace studies at the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute.

In early September 2011, President Sarkozy of France declared the NATO-led military intervention in Libya a success. I disagree with his assessment for four reasons:

1. The known result of six months of fighting is thousands killed and even more injured, with fighting continuing as of this writing.
2. The use of force was not a last resort as required by international law and the just war doctrine.
3. The use of force could not be predicted to do more good than harm, as also required by international law and the just war doctrine.
4. The United Nations Security Council authorized only a limited use of force for civilian protection. The disregard of these limits may undermine the Council’s authority, along with the general prohibition on the use of force.

NO MEASURE OF SUCCESS

In late August, the rebels announced that 50,000 had been killed in the civil war.¹  A week later, they revised their numbers down to 30,000 killed with tens of thousands more injured.²  Tens of thousands killed is no measure of success.

One can respond to the casualty figures by arguing that more might have been killed without the intervention. This is true, but in line with international law, the resort to force requires a prediction about the necessity and cost of intervention. Serious analysis prior to the war could have predicted high casualties resulting from military intervention.

NOT A LAST RESORT

The intervention was not a last resort. Sanctions, including an arms embargo, had hardly been put in place when the bombs began to fly. There was no attempt to use peaceful means to protect civilians such as gaining safe passage out of Benghazi.³  The rebels wanted no negotiation that might lead to Qaddafi stepping down in exchange for amnesty or a safe haven abroad.⁴  In May, the apostolic vicar of Tripoli called the decision to bomb and forego peaceful means immoral.⁵

NO CERTAINTY OF GOOD

Little is known about the leaders of the uprising. Some were high-ranking officials who defected from the Qaddafi regime with which they had been associated for decades. These individuals who worked with a dictator for decades raise real questions about whether a resort to military force on their behalf will end up doing more good than harm.

The Security Council vote to authorize military force was close, with only ten affirmative votes (nine are needed for approval). Five states abstained, including Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia.  The Germans abstained because they did not see the need for military intervention. The principle of necessity in international law requires that any use of force under the United Nations Charter must be a last resort and have the prospect of achieving more good than harm.⁶  The interveners failed to demonstrate either aspect of necessity in this case.

NO RWANDA NOR BOSNIA

When the bombing began Western leaders invoked comparisons to Rwanda and Bosnia. But of course Libya is neither Rwanda nor Bosnia. Qaddafi’s threats against Benghazi were made during the fighting of a civil war. The genocide in Rwanda was perpetrated against unarmed civilians who had been offered protection by UN peacekeepers. The massacre at Srebrenica was committed against civilians who had been promised protection by the UN.

Other, less obvious negative consequences are possible from the war in Libya. Rebels in other places with no chance of gaining power through force may nevertheless take up arms in the hope of being rescued by NATO. The coalition’s contempt for the terms of Resolution 1973 may weaken the authority of the Security Council and the UN Charter norm prohibiting the use of force. NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen described NATO as ‘enforcing’ Resolution 1973, but the world knows that the intervention went beyond the protection of civilians and that its real purpose was armed regime change.

So far, only war appears to be the winner in Libya.

Mary Ellen O’Connell is Research Professor of International Dispute Resolution at the Kroc Institute and the Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame.

In Benghazi, capital of the Libyan revolution, people demonstrate against Qaddafi with the flag of the new "free Libya." Photo: © al-mak / Demotix/Demotix/Corbis

David Cortright

I supported the no-fly zone over Libya as a necessary measure to protect civilians from imminent threat of military attack. During the course of the intervention, however, many questions emerged. What began as a limited mission to prevent a massacre quickly morphed into a policy of armed regime change, with allied forces flying combat support missions for rebels who were seeking to overthrow Qaddafi by force.

Was this what the Security Council authorized? Some saw the mission as an embodiment of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P), the international obligation to step in and help those threatened with mass atrocities by their own governments.

The operation was legal under international law and had the backing of both the UN Security Council and the Arab League. The Arab League voted first, urging the UN to impose a no-fly zone and create “safe zones” in Libya. The Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1973, which authorized multilateral military action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Resolution 1973 contained ambiguities, however. In Paragraph 4, it authorizes states ‘to take all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack.’ In Paragraphs 6 and 8 the Resolution establishes a no-fly zone and authorizes states to take ‘all necessary measures to enforce compliance.’ The former mission was open-ended, the latter more limited.

The United States, France, and other countries interpreted the resolution as authorizing a broad military campaign in support of the rebels, arguing that the protection of civilians necessitated removal of the Qaddafi regime. Russia and other governments argued that partisanship for the rebels went beyond the limited protective mission envisioned in establishing a no-fly zone. What exactly was the military goal, and how much latitude do commanders have in implementing UN resolutions?

The question of legality was complicated within the United States by the Obama administration’s refusal to seek congressional authorization for the use of force. The U.S. Constitution gives the power to declare war and raise and maintain armed forces to Congress, not the President. The War Powers Act, adopted in 1975 to curb executive war-making in the wake of Vietnam, requires the president to obtain congressional authorization for military intervention overseas within 60-90 days of initially committing U.S. forces. Obama claimed not to be bound by this requirement, following the example of his recent predecessors in the White House. His invocation of far-reaching executive war-making privilege contributes to a weakening of congressional oversight and increases the danger of future abuses of power.

The president’s invocation of far-reaching executive war-making privilege contributes to a weakening of congressional oversight and increases the danger of future abuses of power.

The implications of these developments for future policy are uncertain. It was encouraging to see the international community respond with resolve to a dictator’s abuse of his own people. Whether the quick resort to military intervention was necessary is another matter, one that remains hotly debated. Will success in Libya give pause to tyrants elsewhere? That seems a thin hope at best.

Other questions arise.

Will the Libya experience lead to more frequent multilateral military interventions in the future? How do we prevent UN authorization from being a rubber stamp for Western political agendas (as also has happened in Iraq and Afghanistan)? How can we increase the UN’s ability to restrain the use of force? 

Protective intervention may be a legitimate principle of human security. Is the use of force the most appropriate means? The success in Libya may prompt some to argue for more frequent military interventions around the world. This could divert attention from nonmilitary tools of policy—including sanctions and diplomacy—that can help to prevent armed conflict and human rights abuse.

The Libya intervention also raises question about NATO’s role.

Is it appropriate for the alliance to act as the instrument of multilateral intervention beyond the Euro-Atlantic region? Is NATO to be the gendarme of the world?

An appropriate institutional and legal framework needs to be created before protective intervention can become global policy. A more diverse security capability also needs to be developed, one that is structured according to human security principles, as Mary Kaldor has advocated, and that is oriented toward policing rather than military action, as Robert Johansen has argued.

On balance the Libya intervention presents more questions than answers, and raises difficult dilemmas that need to be addressed before nations embark on further interventions in the name of protecting civilians.

David Cortright is director of policy studies at the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

I disagree with my colleagues David Cortright and Mary Ellen O’Connell regarding the scope and direction of the Libyan intervention of the Security Council and NATO.

The essential dilemma faced by the international community, as manifest in Security Council debates for Resolutions 1970 and 1973, was that of not having a range of plausible or good choices. This was due to:

• The speed with which the rebels spread their militant challenge against the Libyan government geographically; and
• the level of armed response the Qaddafi regime was clearly mobilizing against rebel strongholds, which were heavily populated by innocent civilians caught in the cross-fire.

FAR REACHING, TARGETED SANCTIONS

In late February, just 11 days after the Benghazi riots and two days after rebels first claimed to hold Misrata, the Security Council imposed far-reaching, targeted sanctions against the Qaddafi family and inner circle of supporters. Through a combination of freezing government and personal assets overseas, a travel ban, and imposing an extensive arms embargo, the Council immediately constrained Qaddafi’s ability to hire mercenaries, raised the price of arms, and altered the costs of on-going loyalty to his regime. By any measure, these sanctions degraded Qaddafi’s real capability to wage an internal war.

The Council passed SCR 1973 because members agreed that Qaddafi was rapidly moving heavy artillery and mechanized forces to level Benghazi and kill thousands of civilians.

Mary Ellen O’Connell may be correct that the decisions of the Council and NATO were made in too short of time and lacked in-depth debate. But that was because the time before small battles turned to massacres was all too short. The Council passed SCR 1973 because members agreed that Qaddafi was rapidly moving heavy artillery and mechanized forces to level Benghazi and kill thousands of civilians.

THE OPTIONS ON THE TABLE

The international community was either going to watch helplessly as a massacre occurred in Benghazi, or it was going to take strong military action to prevent this. In a perfect world the creation of a humanitarian corridor to permit the evacuation of innocent civilians would have been preferable. So too would have been a ceasefire among all fighting factions. But such options were not acceptable to either the rebels or the Qaddafi regime.

NATO’s rapid destruction of Qaddafi’s capabilities led to increased defections and desertions from the government’s armed forces and thus fewer bloody battles with the rebels.

I agree that NATO adopted a permissive interpretation of SCR 1973 in deciding to attack and destroy substantial amounts of Qaddafi’s fighting power throughout the country and also in destroying his command and control systems in Tripoli. But these actions were not a violation of that authorization.

GUARANTEEING CIVILIAN PROTECTION

The Russian Federation, China, and other governments claim that NATO’s action was far beyond the Council’s intent. But NATO commanders concluded that such comprehensive attacks were the only way to guarantee fully civilian protection as the fighting intensified. NATO’s rapid destruction of Qaddafi’s capabilities led to increased defections and desertions from the government’s armed forces and thus fewer bloody battles with the rebels. This was most clear in the preservation of Tripoli from any devastating fighting.

Deaths attributable to rebel action and NATO bombing are significantly lower than those caused by the attacks of the Qaddafi regime.

In truth, we will not know for some time the full scope of civilian or combatants casualties caused by NATO, rebel and Qaddafi forces. Well-documented data from February through March reveals between 2,000 and 3,000 Libyans were killed, the vast majority by government forces. Casualty estimates cited for the period after March are wide ranging—from 3,000 to 30,000 civilians killed by all actors. The traditional credible human rights actors now operating in the country all indicate that deaths attributable to rebel action and NATO bombing are significantly lower than those caused by the attacks of the Qaddafi regime.

WAR IS NOT THE WINNER

To be sure, the NATO actions created stronger divisions within the Security Council than already existed regarding whether the Libyan crisis constitutes a ‘threat to peace’ as specified in the UN Charter. Some Council members worry that the Council’s actions amounted to an intervention on one side of a civil war. The practical result is that nothing short of a full scale politicide would now lead the Russian Federation or China to approve either statements or sanctions condemning Syria.

But this does not mean that ‘war was the winner’ in the Security Council decisions and NATO action in Libya. Rather, the vast majority of the Libya people will be winners as the fighting by Qaddafi forces comes to an end and the rule of law and representative government begin to emerge. Were it not for Security Council targeted sanctions and NATO air strikes, however questionable they may be, a brutal internal war and massive casualties almost certainly would have unfolded. They were imperfect but effective actions in an imperfect world.

George A. Lopez is the Hesburgh Chair in Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

Of the several uprisings and pro-democracy revolutions sweeping through the Arab region, only two — Tunisia and Egypt — have been successful so far in toppling despotic rulers and embarking on a transitional process to establish a free democratic system.

The transitions in the two countries have been far from smooth. In Tunisia, the election of the Constituent Assembly, initially scheduled to take place this July, has been postponed to October to give political actors more time to prepare for writing a new constitution. Egypt has been experiencing similar calls for delay. Some groups are advocating a “constitution first” process, contrary to the results of the referendum that took place in March, and are urging the postponement of legislative elections scheduled for September.

In both countries, the structures of the old regime have not been completely dismantled. An atmosphere of mistrust among political elites, particularly between liberals and Islamists, is precluding the emergence of needed consensus on key issues. Major differences exist on such issues as the nature of the state, the role of religion in society, and guidelines for creating a new democratic system.

THE ROLE OF THE U.S. AND THE E.U.

Against this background, policymakers in the United States and the European Union seem anxious to extend their help, in some cases unsolicited. Offers to facilitate the transitional process have ranged from loans and grants to the new governments to ease economic difficulties, to injecting millions of dollars into various civil society organizations and advocacy groups.

Some 600 nongovernmental organizations in Egypt have applied for assistance during the transitional phase.

The newly appointed U.S. ambassador to Egypt, Anne W. Patterson, reported to Congress in June that she is dispensing $40 million for the support of democracy in Egypt and that 600 nongovernmental organizations have applied for assistance during the transitional phase. Given that Islamists refuse to receive aid from the West, U.S. support will likely go to organizations and activists who share Western liberal values. The Egyptian minister of international cooperation and planning recently complained of interference by U.S. Agency for International Development in the internal affairs of Egypt. Providing aid to Western-oriented groups that have little support within the country is seen by some as an attempt to manipulate Egypt’s transition process.

NO HARM, NO INTERFERENCE

In these delicate and precarious times, Western policies need to be inspired by clear guidelines. A first principle is “do no harm.” Western policymakers should respect the wisdom of the Egyptian and Tunisian people, who have proven their mettle by overthrowing dictators without resorting to arms. U.S. officials should be sensitive to the will of the people of the region to govern themselves and to build responsive and accountable political systems.

Policymakers should be sensitive to the will of the people to govern themselves and to build responsive and accountable political systems.

A second useful guideline is “do not interfere unless asked.” The emerging democracies in the region will certainly need help. Egypt and Tunisia already suffer from pressing economic difficulties because of the unstable context that revolutions generate and a lack of experience in transitioning to democracy.  But offering help that is not wanted can be seen as violating the principle of self-determination.  A new basis of cooperation and true partnership not dependency and submission needs to be developed.

The U.S. should work with all groups that are pledged to respect the electoral process, including Islamic groups.

The West should not favor one side over another. This will be perceived as interfering in the elections or trying to influence the transition process to serve Western purposes. The U.S. should work with all groups that are pledged to respect the electoral process. This includes Islamic groups, which have substantial popular support in Egypt and Tunisia.  Many in the West fear such groups, but organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood have a long history of resistance to tyranny and have recently acted with moderation in seeking to work with other parties and factions. In Turkey the moderately Islamist Justice and Development Party of Prime Minister Erdogan has acted responsibly and won substantial public support in free and fair elections.

The U.S. should respect the will of Egyptian and Tunisian voters. We should agree to work with all parties that have the support of the people and that respect the principles of freedom and democracy that were the driving spirit of the revolutions.

Emad El-Din Shahin is the Luce Associate Professor of Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding at the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.