Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf

Since the 1979 Islamic revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis, the United States has imposed sanctions against Iran on a continuous basis. The initial measures were moderately influential in resolving the hostage crisis, when combined with intensive diplomatic efforts. But sanctions on Iran have not been successful in changing the behavior of Iran’s leadership. And they have done nothing to reverse Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

THE FAILURE OF U.S. SANCTIONS

After the release of the hostages, the United States did not lift sanctions against Iran. Instead, it sustained and strengthened sanctions during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s and further reinforced them through the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act in the mid-1990s.

The goals of U.S. sanctions are to end Iran’s support for militant groups such as Hamas and Hizbollah, gain Tehran’s endorsement of the Middle East peace process, and prevent the development of weapons of mass destruction. Iran has steadfastly refused to discuss these topics, however, until sanctions are lifted and the United States returns billions of dollars of financial assets that were frozen in 1979.

George A. Lopez

A man prays after exiting a mosque in Hamedan, Iran. Photo by Damon Lynch.

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The nuclear standoff between Iran and the western powers has intensified to the point where the only question being asked in Washington is how “crippling” — to use Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s preferred term — the new sanctions will be. Congress has adopted legislation to embargo gasoline imports to Iran and impose an additional asset freeze on Iranian banks and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Washington certainly has ample reason to impose new penalties on Iran. Tehran continues to defy U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding enriched uranium. In October, Iran walked away from a deal to exchange its low-level enriched uranium for internationally processed highly enriched uranium, which was urgently needed for medical purposes. Moreover, Iran has not moderated its support for terrorist groups, and its violent repression of domestic dissent has intensified.

An interview with Peter Wallensteen

Peter Wallensteen, a professor at Uppsala University in Sweden and the Kroc Institute at Notre Dame, is an expert on economic sanctions and regime change. We asked him about the reform movement in Iran and how it would be affected by additional sanctions.

How does today’s reform movement compare with the 1978-79 revolution?

The revolt against the Shah was well organized and largely non-violent. It worked because there were serious tensions within the regime, with leading Iranian figures opposed to the Shah. A key turning point was the 1978 walk-out, in which people refused to turn up to work and were able to sustain themselves with support from the mosques. This was an unprecedented form of “internal sanctions” on the regime. Nothing like this has happened yet in Iran. However, the persistence of the Iranian resistance suggests that it has some support from within the regime.

One major difference is that the 1978-79 revolt fed on anti-Americanism, symbolized by attacks on cinemas that showed Western movies. Such sentiments certainly still exist in the population, but they are not driving the resistance. Greater anti-Western sentiments could actually undermine support for the opposition if the regime can succeed in portraying the resistance as a creation of the CIA. The reform movement is seeking to maintain its legitimacy by labeling itself the Green Movement (the color of Islam) and using religious holy days for demonstrations.